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STREAM/BLOCK CIPHERS, DIFFERENCE EQUATIONS AND
ALGEBRAIC ATTACKS
ROBERTO LA SCALA∗ AND SHARWAN K. TIWARI∗∗
Abstract. In this paper we introduce a general class of stream and block
ciphers that are defined by means of systems of (ordinary) explicit difference
equations over a finite field. We call this class “difference ciphers”. Many
important ciphers such as systems of LFSRs, Trivium/Bivium and KeeLoq
are difference ciphers. To the purpose of studying their underlying explicit
difference systems, we introduce key notions as state transition endomorphisms
and show conditions for their invertibility. Reducible and periodic systems are
also considered. We then propose general algebraic attacks to difference ciphers
which are experimented by means of Bivium and KeeLoq.
1. Introduction
Stream and block ciphers are generally defined by recursive rules determining
the evolution of a vector, which is called the state or register of the cipher, with
entries in a finite field. The evolution runs along a discrete time corresponding to
computer clocks and the key of the cipher is usually contained in the initial state.
In many important ciphers like Trivium and KeeLoq [3, 6], such recursion is
defined by a state transition function which is the one corresponding to a system of
(ordinary) explicit difference equations. Such systems are fundamental notion, for
instance, in the theory of discrete dynamical system (see, among others, [8]) where
the state vectors have usually real or complex coordinates.
If the difference equations are algebraic ones, which is always the case over a
finite field, the theory of difference algebras (see [4, 20, 27]) provides important
insights about the structure and the solutions of a system of them. In particular,
by mimicking the theory of commutative algebras, one has the notion of difference
ideal and corresponding difference variety. Note that a system of explicit difference
equations is easier to study than the implicit case because the state transition
function provides a straightforward existence and uniqueness theorem for solutions
(see Theorem 2.3).
The simplest application of these ideas to ciphers (or pseudorandom number
generators) are systems of Linear Feedback Shift Registers (briefly LFSRs). In this
case, all difference equations defining the evolution of the cipher state are linear
ones and the keystream (or pseudorandom binary sequence) is obtained by means
of a combining (or filtering) function which is usually a non-linear polynomial. Note
that the complete cipher can be treated as a special system of explicit difference
equations where all equations except that one are linear. Another similar stream
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cipher is Trivium where one has three quadratic difference equations and a linear
combining polynomial.
If the state transition function is invertible, one has a possible flaw for the cor-
responding stream cipher. In fact, by using the inverse of the difference system
governing the state, some opponent may recover the initial state containing the
key by attacking any internal state. This technique has been used, for instance, to
attack Trivium cipher and its simplified version Bivium (see [12, 14] and Section
5 and 6).
On the other hand, if an invertible difference system contains a subsystem that
can be used to evolve separately a key which is a part of the initial state of the
complete system, then this flaw becomes a resource for defining a block cipher.
In this case, in fact, the plaintext is defined as the complement of the key in the
initial state and the corresponding ciphertext is contained in a final state. The
inverse system provides hence decryption. These ideas appear, for instance, in the
definition of the block cipher KeeLoq. As it happens with KeeLoq, note that a
possible weackness of such a cipher may arise from having a small period for the
key subsystem (see [5, 15] and Section 5 and 7).
The present paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce basic notions
and results about system of (algebraic ordinary) explicit difference equations over
any base field. In particular, we introduce state transition endomorphisms and
difference Gro¨bner bases, relating such notions by means of Theorem 2.12. In
Section 3, we provide a Gro¨bner basis method to check for invertibility of a difference
system and compute its inverse system. We also introduce the concept of reducible
system. Periodic systems are defined in Section 4 where we recall the method to
maximize the period of a system of LFSRs over the prime field GF(p).
In Section 5, we introduce the notion of difference stream and block ciphers as
ciphers that are defined by explicit difference systems over a finite field. We then
discuss general methods to perform algebraic attacks on such ciphers. These attacks
are experimented in details in Section 6 and 7 for Bivium and KeeLoq. Finally,
in Section 8 we conclude and propose some suggestions for further developments of
the theory of difference ciphers.
2. Explicit difference system
Let K be any field and fix an integer n > 0. Consider a set of variables X(t) =
{x1(t), . . . , xn(t)}, for any t ∈ N = {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Put X =
⋃
t≥0X(t) and denote
by R = K[X ] the polynomial algebra in the infinite set of variables X . Moreover,
consider the injective algebra endomorphism σ : R→ R such that xi(t) 7→ xi(t+1)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and t ≥ 0. We call σ the shift map of R. The algebra R, endowed
with the map σ, is called the algebra of (ordinary) difference polynomials. If we
consider the subalgebra R(t) = K[X(t)] ⊂ R, it is clear that σ defines by restriction
an algebra isomorphism R(t) → R(t + 1). We also need the following notations.
For any integers r1, . . . , rn ≥ 0 and t ≥ 0, we define the subset
X(t)r1,...,rn = {x1(t), . . . , x1(t+ r1 − 1), . . . , xn(t), . . . , xn(t+ rn − 1)} ⊂ X
and the subalgebra R(t)r1,...,rn = K[X(t)r1,...,rn ] ⊂ R. The shift map σ also
defines an isomorphism R(t)r1,...,rn → R(t + 1)r1,...,rn and we put Xr1,...,rn =
X(0)r1,...,rn , Rr1,...,rn = R(0)r1,...,rn .
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Definition 2.1. Let r1, . . . , rn ≥ 0 be integers and consider some polynomials
f1, . . . , fn ∈ Rr1,...,rn . A system of (algebraic ordinary) explicit difference equations
is by definition an infinite system of polynomial equations of the kind

x1(r1 + t) = σ
t(f1),
...
xn(rn + t) = σ
t(fn).
(t ≥ 0)
Such a system is denoted briefly as
(1)


x1(r1) = f1,
...
xn(rn) = fn.
A K-solution of the system (1) is clearly an n-tuple of functions (a1, . . . , an) where
ai : N→ K (1 ≤ i ≤ n). For any t ≥ 0, the element ai(t) ∈ K is called the value of
the function ai at the clock t.
Definition 2.2. Consider an explicit difference system (1). For any t ≥ 0, we
define the algebra endomorphism T(t) : R(t)r1,...,rn → R(t)r1,...,rn such that, for
any i = 1, 2, . . . , n
xi(t) 7→ xi(t+ 1), . . . , xi(t+ ri − 2) 7→ xi(t+ ri − 1), xi(t+ ri − 1) 7→ σ
t(fi).
By abuse of notation, we have that σT(t) = T(t + 1)σ and we put T = T(0). If
r = r1 + . . .+ rn, we denote by Tˆ : K
r → Kr the polynomial map corresponding to
T. For any polynomial f ∈ Rr1,...,rn and for each vector v ∈ K
r, one has that
(2) T (f)(v) = f(Tˆ(v)).
If (a1, . . . , an) is a K-solution of (1) and t ≥ 0, we call the vector
v(t) = (a1(t), . . . , a1(t+ r1 − 1), . . . , an(t), . . . , an(t+ rn − 1)) ∈ K
r
the state of (a1, . . . , an) at the clock t. In particular, v(0) is the initial state of
(a1, . . . , an). Then, the function Tˆ maps the t-state v(t) into the (t + 1)-state
v(t+ 1), for all clocks t ≥ 0. We call T the state transition endomorphism and Tˆ
the state transition map of the explicit difference system (1).
We have the following existence and uniqueness theorem for the solutions of an
explicit system.
Theorem 2.3. Denote by VK the set of all K-solutions of the explicit difference
system (1). We have a bijective map ι : VK → Kr such that
(a1, . . . , an) 7→ (a1(0), . . . , a1(r1 − 1), . . . , an(0), . . . , an(rn − 1)).
In other words, the system (1) has a unique K-solution once fixed its initial state.
Moreover, the maps ι, ι−1 are both polynomial ones.
Proof. Consider the state transition map Tˆ : Kr → Kr of (1) which is a polynomial
map. Observe that all powers Tˆt : Kr → Kr (t ≥ 0) are also polynomial maps. If
v(t) = (a1(t), . . . , a1(t+ r1 − 1), . . . , an(t), . . . , an(t+ rn − 1))
denotes the t-state of a K-solution (a1, . . . , an) ∈ VK, the inverse map
ι−1 : v(0) 7→ (a1, . . . , an)
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is obtained in the following way. The value a1(t) is the first coordinate of the vector
v(t) = Tˆt(v(0)), a2(t) is its (r1 +1)-th coordinate and so on. Since projections and
Tˆt are polynomial maps, we conclude that ι−1 is also such a map. 
Consider the state transition endomorphism T : Rr1,...,rn → Rr1,...,rn of the
system (1). Note that all powers Tt : Rr1,...,rn → Rr1,...,rn (t ≥ 0) are also endo-
morphisms whose corresponding polynomial maps are the functions Tˆt : Kr → Kr.
For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and t ≥ 0, we define the polynomial
fi,t = T
t(xi(0)) ∈ Rr1,...,rn .
By the argument of Theorem 2.3 and the identity (2), it follows that ai(t) =
fi,t(v(0)), for all K-solutions (a1, . . . , an) ∈ VK.
We introduce now the notion of difference Gro¨bner basis which provides very
often an alternative way to compute the polynomial fi,t.
Definition 2.4. Let I be an ideal of the algebra R. We call I a difference ideal if
σ(I) ⊂ I. Denote Σ = {σt | t ≥ 0} and let G be a subset of R. Then, we define
Σ(G) = {σt(g) | g ∈ G, t ≥ 0} ⊂ R. We call G a difference basis of a difference
ideal I if Σ(G) is a basis of I as an ideal of R. In other words, all elements f ∈ I
are such that f =
∑
i fiσ
ti(gi) where fi ∈ R, gi ∈ G and ti ≥ 0. In this case, we
denote 〈G〉σ = 〈Σ(G)〉 = I.
Consider an explicit difference system (1) and define the subset
G = {x1(r1)− f1, . . . , xn(rn)− fn} ⊂ R.
If I = 〈G〉σ, we have that (a1, . . . , an) is a K-solution of the system (1) if and only
if this is a simultaneous K-solution of all polynomials f ∈ I. Then, we also say that
(a1, . . . , an) is a K-solution of the difference ideal I and we put VK(I) = VK. For
defining Gro¨bner bases, one needs to introduce monomial orderings on R.
Definition 2.5. Let ≺ be a total ordering on the setM = Mon(R) of all monomials
of R. We call ≺ a monomial ordering of R if the following properties hold:
(i) ≺ is a multiplicatively compatible ordering, that is, if m′ ≺ m′′ then mm′ ≺
mm′′, for all m,m′,m′′ ∈M ;
(ii) ≺ is a well-ordering, that is, every non-empty subset of M has a minimal
element.
In this case, it follows immediately that
(iii) 1 ≺ m, for all m ∈M,m 6= 1.
Even though the variables set X is infinite, by Higman’s Lemma [13] the polyno-
mial algebra R = K[X ] can be always endowed with a monomial ordering. For the
following version of this key result, see for instance [1] Corollary 2.3 and remarks
at the beginning of page 5175.
Proposition 2.6. Let ≺ be a total ordering on M which verifies the properties
(i), (iii) of Definition 2.5. If the restriction of ≺ to the variables set X ⊂ M is a
well-ordering then ≺ is also a well-ordering onM , that is, it is a monomial ordering
of R.
To introduce difference Gro¨bner bases, we need monomial orderings that are
compatible with the shift map.
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Definition 2.7. Let ≺ be a monomial ordering of R. We call ≺ a difference
monomial ordering of R if m ≺ m′ implies that σ(m) ≺ σ(m′), for all m,m′ ∈M .
Note that if ≺ is a difference monomial ordering, we have immediately that
m ≺ σ(m), for all m ∈ M,m 6= 1. An important class of difference monomial
orderings can be defined in the following way. Recall that all polynomial algebras
R(t) = K[X(t)] (t ≥ 0) are in fact isomorphic by means of the shift map. Then, let
us consider a same monomial ordering for all such algebras. Since R =
⊗
t≥0R(t),
we can define on R the product monomial ordering such that X(0) ≺ X(1) ≺ . . ..
For any choice of a monomial ordering on R(0), this is clearly a difference monomial
ordering of R that we call clock-based.
From now on, we assume that R is endowed with a difference monomial ordering.
Let f =
∑
i cimi ∈ R with mi ∈ M and 0 6= ci ∈ K. If mk = max≺{mi}, we put
lm(f) = mk, lc(f) = ck and lt(f) = ckmk. Since ≺ is a difference ordering, one has
that lm(σ(f)) = σ(lm(f)) and hence lc(σ(f)) = σ(lc(f)), lt(σ(f)) = σ(lt(f)). If
G ⊂ R, we denote lm(G) = {lm(f) | f ∈ G, f 6= 0} and we put LM(G) = 〈lm(G)〉.
Let I be an ideal of R. A polynomial f =
∑
i cimi ∈ R is called normal modulo
I if mi /∈ LM(I), for all i. One proves (see for instance [10]) that for any f ∈ R
there is a unique normal polynomial NFI(f) ∈ R such that f − NFI(f) ∈ I. We
call NFI(f) the normal form of f modulo I.
Proposition 2.8. Let G ⊂ R. Then lm(Σ(G)) = Σ(lm(G)). In particular, if I is
a difference ideal of R then LM(I) is also a difference ideal.
Proof. Since R is endowed with a difference monomial ordering, one has that
lm(σ(f)) = σ(lm(f)), for any f ∈ R, f 6= 0. Then, Σ(lm(I)) = lm(Σ(I)) ⊂ lm(I)
and therefore LM(I) = 〈lm(I)〉 is a difference ideal. 
Definition 2.9. Let I ⊂ R be a difference ideal and G ⊂ I. We call G a differ-
ence Gro¨bner basis of I if lm(G) is a difference basis of LM(I). In other words,
lm(Σ(G)) = Σ(lm(G)) is a basis of LM(I), that is, Σ(G) is a Gro¨bner basis of I as
an ideal of R.
For an optimized version of the Buchberger procedure for difference Gro¨bner
bases, we refer to [9, 19].
Proposition 2.10. Consider an explicit difference system (1) and assume that R
is endowed with a difference monomial ordering such that xi(ri) ≻ lm(fi), for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then, the set G = {x1(r1)−f1, . . . , xn(rn)−fn} is a difference Gro¨bner
basis.
Proof. From the assumption on the monomial ordering it follows that xi(ri) =
lm(xi(ri) − fi), for any i. By the linearity of such distinct leading monomials, we
conclude that G is a difference Gro¨bner basis. 
From now on, we assume that xi(ri) ≻ lm(fi), for any i. If I ⊂ R is the
difference ideal generated by the set G = {x1(r1)− f1, . . . , xn(rn)− fn}, the above
result implies that LM(I) = 〈x1(r1), . . . , xn(rn)〉σ ⊂ R. In other words, the set
of normal polynomials modulo I is exactly the subalgebra Rr1,...,rn = K[Xr1,...,rn ]
where by definition Xr1,...,rn = {x1(0), . . . , x1(r1 − 1), . . . , xn(0), . . . , xn(rn − 1)}.
Proposition 2.11. The map η : R → Rr1,...,rn , f 7→ NFI(f) is an algebra homo-
morphism. In other words, one has the algebra isomorphism η′ : R/I → Rr1,...,rn
such that f + I 7→ NFI(f).
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Proof. By definition, we have that η is a surjective K-linear map and Ker η = I.
Then, it is sufficient to show that mm′ /∈ LM(I), for all monomials m,m′ /∈ LM(I).
This holds because LM(I) is an ideal which is generated by variables. 
Theorem 2.12. Let T : Rr1,...,rn → Rr1,...,rn be the state transition endomorphism
of the system (1) and consider the algebra endomorphism σ′ : R/I → R/I such
that f + I 7→ σ(f) + I. Then, one has that Tη′ = η′σ′. In particular, for each
polynomial f ∈ Rr1,...,rn and for all t ≥ 0, we have that T
t(f) = NFI(σ
t(f)).
Proof. Consider a polynomial f ∈ Rr1,...,rn , that is, f = NFI(f). The polynomial
T(f) ∈ Rr1,...,rn is obtained from the polynomial σ(f) ∈ R simply by applying
the identities xi(ri) = fi (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Because xi(ri) − fi ∈ I, we conclude that
σ(f)− T(f) ∈ I. 
Observe finally that the above result implies that fi,t = T
t(xi(0)) = NFI(xi(t)).
3. Invertible systems
An important class of explicit difference systems are the ones such that a t-state
can be obtained from a t′-state also for t′ ≥ t.
Definition 3.1. For an explicit difference system (1), consider the state transi-
tion endomorphism T : Rr1,...,rn → Rr1,...,rn and the corresponding state transition
map Tˆ : Kr → Kr (r = r1 + . . . + rn). We call the system invertible if T is an
automorphism. In this case, Tˆ is also a bijective map.
We recall now an effective invertibility criterion for endomorphisms of polynomial
algebras. For a complete reference see [26]. Recall that a Gro¨bner basis G =
{g1, . . . , gr} is called (completely) reduced if the polynomial gi is normal modulo
the ideal generated by G \ {gi}, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r.
Theorem 3.2. Let X = {x1, . . . , xr}, X ′ = {x′1, . . . , x
′
r} be two disjoint variable
sets and define the polynomial algebras P = K[X ], P ′ = K[X ′] and Q = K[X∪X ′] =
P⊗P ′. Consider an algebra endomorphism ϕ : P → P such that x1 7→ g1, . . . , xr 7→
gr (gi ∈ P ) and the corresponding ideal J ⊂ Q which is generated by the set
{x′1 − g1, . . . , x
′
r − gr}. Moreover, we endow the polynomial algebra Q by a product
monomial ordering such that X ≻ X ′. Then, the map ϕ is an automorphism of P
if and only if the reduced Gro¨bner basis of J is of the kind {x1 − g′1, . . . , xr − g
′
r}
where g′i ∈ P
′, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r. In this case, if ϕ′ : P ′ → P ′ is the algebra
endomorphism such that x′1 7→ g
′
1, . . . , x
′
r 7→ g
′
r and ξ : P → P
′ is the isomorphism
x1 7→ x′1, . . . , xr 7→ x
′
r, we have that ξ ϕ
−1 = ϕ′ ξ.
Proposition 3.3. Let T : Rr1,...,rn → Rr1,...,rn be the state transition automor-
phism corresponding to an invertible system (1), namely (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
xi(0) 7→ xi(1), . . . , xi(ri − 2) 7→ xi(ri − 1), xi(ri − 1) 7→ fi.
Denote R′r1,...,rn = K[X
′
r1,...,rn
] where
X ′r1,...,rn = {x
′
1(0), . . . , x
′
1(r1 − 1), . . . , x
′
n(0), . . . , x
′
n(rn − 1)}
and put Qr1,...,rn = Rr1,...,rn ⊗ R
′
r1,...,rn
. Consider the ideal J ⊂ Qr1,...,rn that is
generated by the following polynomials, for any i = 1, 2, . . . n
x′i(0)− xi(1), . . . , x
′
i(ri − 2)− xi(ri − 1), x
′
i(ri − 1)− fi.
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With respect to a product monomial ordering of the algebra Qr1,...,rn such that
Xr1,...,rn ≻ X
′
r1,...,rn
, the reduced Gro¨bner basis of J has the following form
xi(1)− x
′
i(0), . . . , xi(ri − 1)− x
′
i(ri − 2), xi(0)− f
′
i .
where f ′i ∈ R
′
r1,...,rn
, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof. By applying Theorem 3.2, it is sufficient to observe that the set
G =
⋃
i
{xi(1)− x
′
i(0), . . . , xi(ri − 1)− x
′
i(ri − 2)} ⊂ J
is the reduced Gro¨bner basis for the ideal of Qr1,...,rn that is generated by it. 
By the above result, we obtain a sufficient condition to invertibility which is
immediate to verify.
Corollary 3.4. Consider an explicit difference system (1) and assume that fi =
xki(0) + gi where {x(0)k1 , . . . , x(0)kn} = X(0) = {x1(0), . . . , xn(0)} and the poly-
nomial gi has all variables in the set Xr1,...,rn \X(0), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then, the
system (1) is invertible.
Proof. With the same notations and assumptions of Proposition 3.3, consider the
set
G =
⋃
i
{xi(1)− x
′
i(0), . . . , xi(ri − 1)− x
′
i(ri − 2)} ⊂ J
Since the variables of gi are in Xr1,...,rn \X(0), the normal form g
′
i modulo the ideal
generated by G is clearly a polynomial with variables in the set
X ′r1,...,rn \ {x
′
1(r1 − 1), . . . , x
′
n(rn − 1)}.
Then, the reduced Gro¨bner basis of the ideal J ⊂ Qr1,...,rn is given by the following
polynomials, for any i = 1, 2, . . . , n
xi(1)− x
′
i(0), . . . , xi(ri − 1)− x
′
i(ri − 2), xki(0)− x
′
i(ri − 1)− g
′
i.

Definition 3.5. For an explicit difference system (1), consider the ideal J ⊂
Qr1,...,rn = Rr1,...,rn ⊗ R
′
r1,...,rn
which is generated by the following polynomials,
for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n
x′i(0)− xi(1), . . . , x
′
i(ri − 2)− xi(ri − 1), x
′
i(ri − 1)− fi.
We call J the state transition ideal of the system (1).
From now on, we assume that Qr1,...,rn is endowed with a product monomial
ordering such that Xr1,...,rn ≻ X
′
r1,...,rn
.
Definition 3.6. Consider an invertible system (1) and the corresponding state
transition ideal J ⊂ Qr1,...,rn. If the set
G =
⋃
i
{xi(1)− x
′
i(0), . . . , xi(ri − 1)− x
′
i(ri − 2), xi(0)− f
′
i}
is the reduced Gro¨bner basis of J , we denote by gi the image of f
′
i under the algebra
isomorphism R′r1,...,rn → Rr1,...,rn such that, for any i = 1, 2, . . . , n
x′i(0) 7→ xi(ri − 1), x
′
i(1) 7→ xi(ri − 2), . . . x
′
i(ri − 1) 7→ xi(0).
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The inverse of an invertible system (1) is by definition the following explicit differ-
ence system
(3)


x1(r1) = g1,
...
xn(rn) = gn.
Let T, S : Rr1,...,rn → Rr1,...,rn be the state transition endomorphisms of an in-
vertible system (1) and its inverse system (3), respectively. Denote by ξ : Rr1,...,rn →
Rr1,...,rn the algebra automorphism such that
xi(0) 7→ xi(ri − 1), xi(1) 7→ xi(ri − 2), 7→ xi(ri − 1) 7→ xi(0).
By Theorem 3.2 and Proposition 3.3, we have clearly that ξS = T−1ξ.
Proposition 3.7. Let (3) be the inverse system of an invertible system (1). If
(a1, . . . , an) is a K-solution of (1), consider its t-state (t ≥ 0)
v = (a1(t), . . . , a1(t+ r1 − 1), . . . , an(t), . . . , an(t+ rn − 1)).
Denote by (b1, . . . , bn) the K-solution of (3) whose initial state is
v′ = (a1(t+ r1 − 1), . . . , a1(t), . . . , an(t+ rn − 1), . . . , an(t)).
If the t-state of (b1, . . . , bn) is
u′ = (b1(t), . . . , b1(t+ r1 − 1), . . . , bn(t), . . . , bn(t+ rn − 1)),
then the initial state of (a1, . . . , an) is
u = (b1(t+ r1 − 1), . . . , b1(t), . . . , bn(t+ rn − 1), . . . , bn(t)).
Proof. Denote by Tˆ, Sˆ : Kr → Kr (r = r1 + . . . + rn) the state transition maps of
the systems (1),(3), respectively. By definition, we have that u′ = Sˆt(v′). Since
ξS = T−1ξ, we conclude that u = Tˆ−t(v). 
Another useful notion is the following one.
Definition 3.8. An explicit difference system (1) is called reducible if there is an
integer 0 < m < n such that we have a subsystem
(4)


x1(r1) = f1,
...
xm(rm) = fm.
In other words, one has that f1, . . . , fm ∈ Rr1,...,rm = K[Xr1,...,rm ] where Xr1,...,rm =
{x1(0), . . . , x1(r1 − 1), . . . , xm(0), . . . , xm(rm − 1)}. In this case, the state transi-
tion endomorphism and map of (4) are just the restrictions of the corresponding
functions of (1) to the subring Rr1,...,rm ⊂ Rr1,...,rn and the subspace K
r1+...+rm ⊂
Kr1+...+rn, respectively.
One obtains immediately the following result.
Proposition 3.9. Let (1) be a reducible invertible system. Then, its subsystem
(4) is also invertible. Moreover, the inverse system of (1) is also reducible with a
subsystem which is the inverse system of (4).
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4. Periodic systems
Definition 4.1. For an invertible system (1), consider the state transition map
Tˆ : Kr → Kr (r = r1 + . . .+ rn). We call the system periodic if there is an integer
d > 0 such that Tˆd = id. In this case, the period of the map Tˆ is called the period
of the system (1).
Proposition 4.2. Consider a periodic system (1) with period d. If (a1, . . . , an) is
a K-solution of (1), then all functions ai are periodic, that is, ai(t) = ai(t+ d) for
all clocks t ≥ 0.
Proof. If v ∈ Kr is the initial state of (a1, . . . , an), by the argument of Theorem 2.3
we have that a1(t) is the first coordinate of the vector Tˆ
t(v) ∈ Kr. Since Tˆt = Tˆt+d,
one has that Tˆt(v) = Tˆt+d(v) and therefore a1(t) = a1(t+ d). In a similar way, we
also prove that ai(t) = ai(t+ d) (1 < i ≤ n). 
Note that if K = GF(q) is a finite field, the symmetric group S(Kr) has finite
order and therefore all invertible systems are in fact periodic. We also observe that
if K is an infinite field, then the state transition endomorphism T is bijective if and
only if the state transition map Tˆ is bijective. Moreover, we have that T is periodic
if and only if Tˆ is periodic and in this case these maps have the same period. Such
facts are consequences of the following general result (see for instance [21, 23]).
Proposition 4.3. Consider a polynomial algebra P = K[x1, . . . , xr] and an algebra
endomorphism ϕ : P → P such that x1 7→ g1, . . . , xr 7→ gr (gi ∈ P ). Denote by
ϕˆ : Kr → Kr the corresponding polynomial map, that is, for any (α1, . . . , αr) ∈ Kr
(α1, . . . , αr) 7→ (g1(α1, . . . , αr), . . . , gr(α1, . . . , αr)).
The map ϕ 7→ ϕˆ is an homomorphism from the monoid of the algebra endomorphism
of P to the monoid of polynomial maps Kr → Kr. If K is an infinite field, such
monoid homomorphism is bijective. Otherwise, if K = GF(q) then the map ϕ 7→ ϕˆ
induces a monoid isomorphism from the monoid of algebra endomorphisms of the
quotient algebra P/L, where L = 〈xq1−x1, . . . , x
q
r −xr〉 ⊂ P . Note that P and P/L
are the coordinate algebras of the affine space Kr for the case that K is an infinite
or finite field, respectively.
An important and difficult task is to compute, or at least bound, the period of
a periodic explicit difference system. As usual, the task becomes easy in the linear
case.
Definition 4.4. An explicit difference system (1) is called linear if all polynomials
fi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) are homogeneous linear ones. In other words, the state transition
map Tˆ : Kr → Kr is a K-linear endomorphism of the vector space Kr.
Restating the Rational (or Frobenius) Canonical Form of a square matrix (see,
for instance, [16]) in terms of K-linear endomorphisms, one has the following result.
Proposition 4.5. Let ψ : Kr → Kr be any K-linear endomorphism. Then, there
is a K-linear automorphism ξ : Kr → Kr such that ψ′ = ξψξ−1 can be decomposed
as a direct sum ψ′ =
⊕
1≤i≤n ψ
′
i where ψ
′
i : K
ri → Kri (r1 + . . . + rn = r) is a
K-linear endomorphism such that, for any (α0, . . . , αri−1) ∈ K
ri
ψ′i(α0, . . . , αri−2, αri−1) = (α1, . . . , αri−1, gi(α0, . . . , αri−1))
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and gi is an homogeneous linear polynomial in ri variables. It follows that if ψ is
an automorphism of finite period d, then d = lcm(d1, . . . , dn) where di is the period
of ψ′i.
Note that the above result provides that, up to an invertible K-linear change of
variables, any linear difference system can be obtained in a canonical form, say (1),
where fi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is a linear form which is defined only over the set of variables
{xi(0), . . . , xi(ri − 1)}. In other words, the system is the join of linear difference
equations on disjoint sets of variables. In cryptography (see, for instance, [25]), a
linear difference equation is called a Linear Feedback Shift Register or briefly LFSR.
For cryptographic applications, to have a periodic difference system with a large
period d is a useful property. In the linear case, according to Proposition 4.5, to
maximize d one needs that all di are coprime so that d = d1 · · · dn. Then, the
problem reduces to maximize the period of each single periodic linear difference
equation. This problem has a well-known solution when K = GF(p) = Zp with p a
prime number. For the purpose of completeness, we provide such result.
Proposition 4.6. Consider an invertible linear difference equation
(5) x(r) =
∑
0≤i≤r−1
cix(i) (ci ∈ Zp).
Denote g = tr −
∑
i cit
i ∈ Zp[t] and assume that g is an irreducible polynomial.
Consider the finite field F = GF(pr) = Zp[t]/(g) and the corresponding multiplica-
tive (cyclic) group F∗ = F \ {0}. If the element α = t+ (g) ∈ F∗ is a generator of
F∗, that is, g is a primitive polynomial of Zp[t], then the equation (5) has maximal
period pr − 1.
Proof. The matrix corresponding to the state transition K-linear map Tˆ : Zrp → Z
r
p
of (5) with respect to the canonical basis of Zrp, is indeed the companion matrix A
of the polynomial g, that is
A =


0 1 0 . . . 0
0 0 1 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 . . . 1
c0 c1 c2 . . . cr−1


.
Consider the algebra Mr(Zp) of all square matrices of order r with entries in the
field Zp and denote by Zp[A] ⊂ Mr(Zp) the subalgebra that is generated by the
matrix A. It is well-known that the minimal polynomial of the companion matrix
A is exactly g and hence F = Zp[α] is isomorphic to Zp[A] by the map α 7→ A.
Since α is a generator, that is, an element of maximal period in the cyclic group
F∗, we obtain that the period of α and A is exactly pr − 1. 
5. Difference stream ciphers
From now on, let K = GF(q) be a finite field. It is important to note that in this
case, by Lagrange interpolation, any function Kr → K is in fact a polynomial one.
Moreover, if f ∈ K[x1, . . . , xr ] is the corresponding polynomial, we can assume that
f is normal modulo the ideal L = 〈xq1 − x1, . . . , x
q
r − xr〉, that is, all exponents in
the monomials of f are strictly less than q.
STREAM/BLOCK CIPHERS, DIFFERENCE EQUATIONS AND ALGEBRAIC ATTACKS 11
Definition 5.1. A difference stream cipher C is by definition an explict difference
system (1) together with a polynomial f ∈ Rr1,...,rn . If (a1, . . . , an) is a K-solution
of (1), its initial state is called the key of (a1, . . . , an). Moreover, if v(t) ∈ Kr
(r = r1 + . . . + rn) is the t-state of (a1, . . . , an), the function b : N → K such that
b(t) = f(v(t)) for all t ≥ 0, is called the keystream of (a1, . . . , an). Finally, we call
f the keystream polynomial of the cipher C.
If (1) is linear, that is, a system of LFSRs, the polynomial f is required non-linear
and it is usually called combining or filtering function. Since Rr1,...,rn,0 = Rr1,...,rn ,
observe that a difference stream cipher can also be defined as a special explicit
difference system 

x1(r1) = f1,
...
xn(rn) = fn,
y(0) = f.
In fact, by a K-solution (a1, . . . , an, b) of such a system one obtains the keystream
function b : N→ K of the K-solution (a1, . . . , an) of (1).
In cryptography, a stream cipher (see, for instance, [17]) operates simply by
adding and subtracting the keystream to a stream of plaintexts or ciphertexts. Such
a stream is by definition a function N → K. By a known plaintext attack we
can assume the knowledge of the keystream as the difference between the known
ciphertext and plaintext streams. Note that the keystream is usually provided
by a stream cipher after a sufficiently high number of clocks in order to prevent
cryptanalysis.
Definition 5.2. Let C be a difference stream cipher consisting of the system (1)
and the keystream polynomial f . Let b : N→ K be the keystream of a K-solution of
(1) and fix a clock T ≥ 0. Consider the ideal
J =
∑
t≥T
〈σt(f)− b(t)〉 ⊂ R
and denote by VK(J) the set of simultaneous K-solutions of all polynomials in J ,
or equivalently, of its generators. An algebraic attack to C by the keystream b
after T clocks consists in computing the K-solutions (a1, . . . , an) of the system (1)
such that (a1, . . . , an) ∈ VK(J). In other words, if we consider the difference ideal
corresponding to (1), that is, I = 〈x1(r1) − f1, . . . , xn(rn) − fn〉σ ⊂ R then one
wants to compute VK(I + J) = VK(I) ∩ VK(J) = VK ∩ VK(J).
Since the given function b is the keystream of a K-solution of (1), say (a1, . . . , an),
we have clearly that (a1, . . . , an) ∈ VK(I + J) 6= ∅. For actual ciphers, we have
generally that VK(I + J) = {(a1, . . . , an)}.
Definition 5.3. With the notation of Definition 5.2, denote by V¯K(I + J) ⊂ Kr
the set of keys, that is, initial states of the K-solutions (a1, . . . , an) ∈ VK(I + J).
By Theorem 2.3, there is a bijective map VK(I + J)→ V¯K(I + J) and we have that
V¯K(I) = K
r.
Theorem 5.4. Let T : Rr1,...,rn → Rr1,...,rn be the state transition endomorphism
of the system (1) and put f ′t = T
t(f) ∈ Rr1,...,rn, for all t ≥ 0. Moreover, define
the ideal
J ′ =
∑
t≥T
〈f ′t − b(t)〉 ⊂ Rr1,...,rn .
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Then, we have that V¯K(I + J) = VK(J
′).
Proof. Let (a1, . . . , an) be a K-solution of (1) and denote by v(t) its t-state (t ≥ 0).
By the identity (2), one obtains that
f ′t(v(0)) = T
t(f)(v(0)) = f(Tˆt(v(0))) = f(v(t)).
We conclude that the condition f(v(t)) = b(t) (t ≥ T ) is equivalent to the condition
f ′t(v(0)) = b(t). 
By assuming that xi(ri) ≻ lm(fi) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, that is, G = {x1(r1) −
f1, . . . , xn(rn)− fn} is a difference Gro¨bner basis of the difference ideal I = 〈G〉σ,
by Theorem 2.12 one obtains that
f ′t = T
t(f) = NFI(σ
t(f)).
In actual algebraic attacks, we are given a finite number of values of the keystream
b, that is, for a fixed integer bound B ≥ T , we consider the finitely generated ideal
J ′B =
∑
T≤t≤B
〈f ′t − b(t)〉 ⊂ Rr1,...,rn .
We have clearly that J ′ =
⋃
B≥T J
′
B where J
′
B ⊂ J
′
B+1. Since the polynomial
algebra Rr1,...,rn is finitely generated and hence Noetherian, one has that J
′
B = J
′
for some B ≥ T . In other words, we don’t lose any equation satisfied by the keys
if a sufficiently large number of keystream values is provided for the attack.
To compute the set VK(J
′
B) ⊂ K
r one can use essentially Gro¨bner bases or SAT
solvers when K = GF(2) (see, for instance, [2]). For practical ciphers, one has
generally that VK(J
′
B) = VK(J
′) contains a single K-solution, that is, a single key.
By the Shape Lemma (see, for instance, [18]) one obtains the following result for
K = GF(q).
Proposition 5.5. Consider the polynomial algebra P = K[x1, . . . , xr ] and the ideal
L = 〈xq1−x1, . . . , x
q
r−xr〉 ⊂ P . Moreover, let J ⊂ P be any ideal and denote by V (J)
the set of K¯-solutions of all polynomials f ∈ J where the field K¯ is the algebraic
closure of K. We have that V (L) = Kr and VK(J) = V (J) ∩ K
r = V (J + L)
where J + L ⊂ P is a radical ideal. Moreover, if VK(J) = {(α1, . . . , αn)} then
G = {x1−α1, . . . , xn −αn} is the (reduced) universal Gro¨bner basis of J +L, that
is, its Gro¨bner basis with respect to all monomial orderings of P .
The above result is very useful for algebraic attacks because Gro¨bner bases com-
putations are very sensitive on the monomial orderings and we are free here to
choose the most efficient orderings as DegRevLex. Another possible optimization
when performing the Buchberger algorithm on the ideal J + L ⊂ P consists in
skipping all remaining S-polynomials once each variable xi (1 ≤ i ≤ r) has been
obtained as the leading monomial of an element in the current Gro¨bner basis. In
some cases, this trick speeds up the computation in a significant way.
Let C be a difference stream cipher which is given by the system (1) and the
keystream polynomial f . The polynomial f ′t = T
t(f) ∈ Rr1,...,rn has generally
an high degree if T is large with respect to 0. This is usually the case in actual
ciphers where an high number of clocks is required before the keystream appears.
Nevertheless, if the system (1) is invertible we can always assume that T = 0. In
fact, by means of the notion of inverse system in Definition 3.6, to compute the
T -state is completely equivalent to compute the initial state, that is, the key of a
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K-solution of (1). This is a very effective optimization because it reduces drastically
the degrees of the generators of the ideal J ′B =
∑
T≤t≤B〈f
′
t − b(t)〉 to those of the
generators of the ideal J ′′B =
∑
0≤t≤B−T 〈f
′
t − b(T + t)〉. Recall in fact that we
have to compute a Gro¨bner basis for obtaining K-solutions and such computations
are very sensitive on the degree of the generators. We apply this strategy when
attacking the stream cipher Bivium in Section 6. If the polynomials f ′t have still
high degrees and they are even difficult to compute, an alternative strategy consists
in computing directly the K-solutions of the system (1) which are also solutions of
the fixed degree polynomials σt(f) − b(T + t) (0 ≤ t ≤ B − T ). Even though the
clocks of the variables in X can be bounded, this strategy has the main drawback
that one has to compute a Gro¨bner basis over a generally high number of variables.
We have just observed that difference stream ciphers that are defined by invert-
ible systems show some lack of security with respect to algebraic attacks. On the
other hand, invertible systems can be used to define block ciphers.
Definition 5.6. A difference block cipher C is by definition a reducible invertible
system (1) together with an integer T ≥ 0. If (4) is the subsystem of (1), we put
k = r1+ . . .+rm and l = rm+1+ . . .+rn. If a t-state of a K-solution (a1, . . . , an) of
(1) is denoted as the pair (u(t), v(t)) ∈ Kk×Kl = Kr, we call u(0) the key, v(0) the
plaintext and v(T ) the ciphertext of (a1, . . . , an). Moreover, we call (u(T ), v(T ))
the final state of (a1, . . . , an) and (4) the key subsystem of the cipher C.
With the language of cryptography, the encryption function Eu(0) : K
l → Kl
of the difference block cipher C is given by the map v(0) 7→ v(T ), where the pair
(u(0), v(0)) varies in the affine space Kk ×Kl of all initial states of the K-solutions
of (1). To provide the decryption function we introduce the following notion.
Definition 5.7. Let C be a difference block cipher consisting of a reducible invertible
system (1) and a clock T ≥ 0. The inverse cipher of C is by definition the inverse
system of (1) together with T .
Let C′ be the inverse cipher of C where (3) is the inverse system of (1). Consider
also the key subsystem (4) of C. If u(0) is the key of a solution of (a1, . . . , an) of
(1), we can compute u(T ) by means of (4) without knowing v(0). If we are given
the ciphertext v(T ), we have hence the final state (u(T ), v(T )) of (a1, . . . , an). By
Proposition 3.7, the inverse system (3) provides the computation of the initial state
(u(0), v(0)) of (a1, . . . , an) and in particular of the plaintext v(0). In other words,
the decription function Du(0) : K
l → Kl is obtained as the map v(T ) 7→ v(0) which
is computable by means of the systems (3), (4).
Definition 5.8. Let C be a difference block cipher given by a reducible invertible
system (1) and a clock T ≥ 0. For all t ≥ 0, let (u(t), v(t)) ∈ Kk×Kl be the t-state
of a K-solution of (1) where we denote
v(t) = (am+1(t), . . . , am+1(t+ rm+1 − 1), . . . , an(t), . . . , an(t+ rn − 1)).
Consider the corresponding linear ideal
J(t) =
∑
m+1≤i≤n
〈xi(t)− ai(t), . . . , xi(t+ ri − 1)− ai(t+ ri − 1)〉 ⊂ R
and put J = J(0) + J(T ). An algebraic attack to C by the plaintext-ciphertext
pair (v(0), v(T )) consists in computing the K-solutions (a1, . . . , an) of the system
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(1) such that (a1, . . . , an) ∈ VK(J). If I = 〈x1(r1)− f1, . . . , xn(rn)− fn〉σ ⊂ R, this
is equivalent to compute VK(I + J) = VK(I) ∩ VK(J) = VK ∩ VK(J).
Note that the above attack belongs to the class of known plaintext attacks. Since
the given pair (v(0), v(T )) is obtained by the states (u(t), v(t)) of a K-solution of
(1), say (a1, . . . , an), we have clearly that (a1, . . . , an) ∈ VK(I + J) 6= ∅. For
actual ciphers, one has generally that the set VK(I + J) contains more than one
K-solution. Since computing a unique solution by a Gro¨bner basis is faster than
computing multiple solutions because one uses efficient monomial orderings, we can
obtain uniqueness by attacking with multiple plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
Precisely, fix an integer s > 1 and let (u(t), v(i)(t)) (1 ≤ i ≤ s) be the t-state
of a K-solution (a1, . . . , am, a
(i)
m+1, . . . , a
(i)
n ) of the system (1) where (a1, . . . , am)
is some fixed K-solution of the key subsystem (4). In other words, we consider
some plaintext-ciphertext pairs (v(i)(0), v(i)(T )) (1 ≤ i ≤ s) which are obtained by
a same key u(0). To describe properly a multiple pairs attack, we also need the
following notations.
For each i = 1, 2, . . . , s and t ≥ 0, consider the set of variables X(i)(t) =
{x1(t), . . . , xm(t), x
(i)
m+1(t), . . . , x
(i)
n (t)} where
⋂
iX
(i)(t) = {x1(t), . . . , xm(t)}. We
put X(i) =
⋃
t≥0X
(i)(t) and R(i) = K[X(i)]. Clearly, the polynomial algebra
R(i) is isomorphic to R and we denote by I(i) ⊂ R(i) the ideal which is isomor-
phic to I ⊂ R. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ s, consider (1) as written in the variables X(i)
and let J (i)(t) ⊂ R(i) (t ≥ 0) be the linear ideal corresponding to the t-state of
the K-solution (a1, . . . , am, a
(i)
m+1, . . . , a
(i)
n ) of the system (1). Moreover, we put
X ′ =
⋃
iX
(i), R′ = K[X ′] and we denote by I ′, J ′(t) the ideals of R′ that are
generated by
∑
i I
(i),
∑
i J
(i)(t), respectively. Finally, we put J ′ = J ′(0) + J ′(T ).
Definition 5.9. Let C be a difference block cipher given by a reducible invertible
system (1) and a clock T ≥ 0. An algebraic attack to C by the multiple plaintext-
ciphertext pairs (v(i)(0), v(i)(T )) (1 ≤ i ≤ s) consists in computing the K-solutions
(a1, . . . , am, a
(1)
m+1, . . . , a
(s)
m+1, . . . , a
(1)
n , . . . , a
(s)
n ) ∈ VK(I
′ + J ′).
For practical ciphers, a sufficiently large number of pairs implies that we have
VK(I
′ + J ′) = {(a1, . . . , am, a
(1)
m+1, . . . , a
(s)
m+1, . . . , a
(1)
n , . . . , a
(s)
n )}. By bounding the
clocks of the variables in X ′, one can compute this unique K-solution and hence
its key u(0) = (a1(0), . . . , a1(r1 − 1), . . . , am(0), . . . , am(rm − 1)) using a Gro¨bner
basis computation as in Proposition 5.5. Alternatively, for K = GF(2) one can use
SAT solvers or other methods. In Section 7 we make use of multiple pairs when
attacking the block cipher KeeLoq.
Since the final clock T is usually chosen a large one, the main drawback of this
approach is the high number of variables. Nevertheless, such strategy is generally
the only feasible one. In fact, the normal forms of the generators of J ′(T ) modulo
I ′ + J ′(0) belong to Rr1,...,rm but they may have very high degrees because of the
large clock T . As for stream ciphers, the main problem is hence to reduce somehow
the final clock T . Even though the system (1) of the block cipher C is invertible,
note that we cannot attack an internal state instead of the initial one because the
set VK(I
′ + J ′(t)) (t ≤ T ) generally contains too many solutions. In other words, a
ciphertext only attack is generally too weak for difference block ciphers.
Some better strategy is possible when the period of the key subsystem (4), say d,
is sufficiently small. This technique has been introduced in [5] to attack KeeLoq.
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To simplify its description, let us assume that the final state T is a multiple of d.
Consider the state transition map Tˆ : Kr → Kr of the explicit difference system (1)
and denote by Sˆ : Kk → Kk the state transition map of the subsystem (4). Recall
that Sˆ is just the restriction of the map Tˆ to the subspace Kk ⊂ Kr (k = r1+ . . .+
rm, r = r1 + . . .+ rn). By definition of period, one has that Sˆ
d = id and therefore
Sˆd(u) = u, for all u ∈ Kk. For any t ≥ 0, denote by (u(t), v(t)) ∈ Kk×Kl = Kr the
t-state of a K-solution (a1, . . . , an) of the system (1). Then, the encryption function
Eu(0) : K
l → Kl corresponding to the key u(0) ∈ Kk is the map v(0) 7→ v(T ). By
a chosen plaintext attack, we can assume the knowledge of the bijection Eu(0). If
Kl is a reasonably large space, one has a good chance (see [5]) that Eu(0) has fixed
points v(0) = v(T ) which are also computable. Observe now that v(0) = v(d)
implies that v(0) = v(T ). In fact, by definition (u(d), v(d)) = Tˆd(u(0), v(0)) and
we have that u(d) = Sˆd(u(0)) = u(0). Then, from v(0) = v(d) it follows that
(u(0), v(0)) = Tˆd(u(0), v(0)) and hence (u(0), v(0)) = TˆT (u(0), v(0)) because T is a
multiple of d. We conclude that among the fixed points of the encryption function
Eu(0) one has the fixed points of the map v(0) 7→ v(d). If v(0) = v(d) is such a fixed
point, we have that (v(0), v(0)) = (v(0), v(d)) = (v(0), v(T )), that is, (v(0), v(0)) is
a plaintext-ciphertext pair for the final clocks d and T . In other words, by means
of such pairs we can perform an algebraic attack to the difference block cipher C
assuming that the final clock is just the period of the key subsystem.
Let us conclude this section with a final general observation. When we ap-
ply Proposition 5.5 for solving algebraic systems, an essential trick consists in
adding some linear polynomials to the considered ideal J + L ⊂ K[x1, . . . , xr]
(L = 〈xq1 − x1, . . . , x
q
r − xr〉) in order to speed up the Gro¨bner basis computa-
tion. Such linear polynomials are either elements of J which are given or com-
puted ones, or they correspond to the evaluations of some subset of variables
{xi1 , . . . , xis} ⊂ {x1, . . . , xr}. If some of these evaluations, say xik = αik (αik ∈ K),
is wrong and VK(J) contains a unique solution, one has that
J + L+ 〈xi1 − αi1 , . . . , xis − αis〉 = 〈1〉
and the Gro¨bner basis computation stops as soon as the element 1 is obtained.
Note that using instead a SAT solver, the answer “UNSAT” essentially arrives
when the full space Kr (K = GF(2)) has been examinated. This means that for
wrong evaluations, which are all except that one, Gro¨bner basis solving is generally
faster than SAT solving. We have evidence of this in practice in Section 6.
Note that solving after the evaluation of some bunch of variables is usually called
a guess-and-determine strategy. Its total complexity is the product a · qs where a
is the average solving time for a single guess and qs is the number of guesses for
K = GF(q). We can assume average total complexity as 1/2 · a · qs. Then, the
optimization of the choice of the variables to be guessed is a very important issue
for polynomial system solving and algebraic attacks. The parallelization of the
computation for different guesses is also a viable way to reduce total computing
time.
6. Attacking Bivium
We start with an important example of difference stream cipher which is called
Trivium. This cipher was designed in 2003 by De Cannie`re and Preneel as a
submission to European project eSTREAM [6]. In fact, Trivium was one of the
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winners of the project for the category of hardware-oriented ciphers. Even though
it has been widely cryptanalysed, no critical attacks are known up to date. The
system of explicit difference equations describing Trivium looks quite simple since
it consists only of three quadratic equations over the base field K = GF(2), namely
(6)


x(93) = z(0) + x(24) + z(45) + z(1)z(2),
y(84) = x(0) + y(6) + x(27) + x(1)x(2),
z(111) = y(0) + y(15) + z(24) + y(1)y(2).
Its keystream polynomial is an homogeneous linear one
f = x(0) + x(27) + y(0) + y(15) + z(0) + z(45).
Therefore, a t-state consists of 288 = 93 + 84 + 111 bits, for any clock t ≥ 0. The
keystream bits are known by the attackers starting with clock T = 4 · 288 = 1152.
The key and the initial vector of Trivium are 80 bit vectors and they form together
160 bits of an initial state. The remaining 128 bits are fixed ones.
By Corollary 3.4, we obtain that the system (6) is invertible with inverse system

x(93) = y(0) + x(66) + y(78) + x(91)x(92),
y(84) = z(0) + y(69) + z(87) + y(82)y(83),
z(111) = x(0) + z(66) + x(69) + z(109)z(110).
This allows an algebraic attack to the T -state instead of the initial state containing
the key and the initial vector. Indeed, such an attack shows to have complexity
which is greater than key recovery (80 bit) by exaustive search (see, for instance,
[14]). For this reason, we present instead all optimizations and computational data
that we have obtained for a well-studied simplified version of Trivium cipher which
is called Bivium. The explicit difference system defining Bivium are the following
two quadratic equations
(7)
{
x(93) = y(0) + y(15) + x(24) + y(1)y(2),
y(84) = x(0) + y(6) + x(27) + x(1)x(2),
and its keystream polynomial is
f = x(0) + x(27) + y(0) + y(15).
In this case, the t-states are vectors of 93+ 84 = 177 bits and the keystream starts
at clock T = 4 · 177 = 708. Again, the key and the initial vector are 80 + 80 = 160
bits of the initial state. Corollary 3.4 implies that the system (7) is invertible with
inverse {
x(93) = y(0) + x(66) + y(78) + x(91)x(92),
y(84) = x(0) + x(69) + y(69) + y(82)y(83).
Consider the polynomial algebras R = K[X ] where X =
⋃
t≥0{x(t), y(t)} and
R93,84 = K[X93,84] where X93,94 = {x(0), . . . , x(92), y(0), . . . , y(83)}. If R is en-
dowed with a clock-based monomial ordering, we have that
G = {x(93) + y(0) + y(15) + x(24) + y(1)y(2),
y(84) + x(0) + y(6) + x(27) + x(1)x(2)}
is a difference Gro¨bner basis of the difference ideal I = 〈G〉σ ⊂ R. Consider the
polynomials f ′t = T
t(f) = NFI(σ
t(f)) ∈ R93,84 (t ≥ 0) and let b : N → K be a
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keystream. Since the system (7) is invertible, we can attack the T -state by the ideal
J ′′B =
∑
0≤t≤B−T
〈f ′t + b(T + t)〉 ⊂ R93,84.
We have found experimentally that if the number B − T + 1 of known values of
the keystream is approximately 180, one has a unique K-solution in VK(J
′′
B). In
this case, the maximal degree of the generators of J ′′B is 3. Even though we use a
DegRevLex monomial ordering on R93,84, a Gro¨bner basis of the ideal J
′′
B + L ⊂
R93,84 where
L = 〈x(0)2 + x(0), . . . , x(92)2 + x(92), y(0)2 + y(0), . . . , y(83)2 + y(83)〉
seems to be hard to compute. Then, we make use of a guess-and-determine strategy
to obtain reasonable solving times.
Since all shifts σt(f) (0 ≤ t ≤ 65) of the keystream polynomial f = x(0)+x(27)+
y(0)+y(15) are normal modulo I, we have 66 linear polynomials σt(f)− b(T + t) =
f ′t − b(T + t) ∈ J
′′
B . Because the clocks of the variables in f are all multiple of 3,
we can divide these polynomials into 3 sets of 22 linear polynomials, namely
Si = {σ
t(f)− b(T + t) | 0 ≤ t ≤ 65, t ≡ i mod 3} (0 ≤ i ≤ 2).
By performing Gaussian elimination over Si, we obtain 22 pivot variables and 36
free variables. In other words, for any set Si the evaluation of 36 variables implies
the evaluation of 36+22 = 58 variables. This is a good trick that was first observed
in [22]. In our computations, we choose the set S2, that is, we guess the following
36 free variables
x(68), x(71), . . . , x(92), y(2), y(5), . . . , y(80)
and we obtain the evaluation of the 22 pivot variables
x(2), x(5), . . . , x(65).
Moreover, note that one has the polynomial f ′68 − b(T + t) ∈ J
′′
B where
f ′68 = y(83) + x(68) + y(68) + x(26) + y(17) + y(4)y(3) + y(2).
By guessing the variables y(3), y(4) together with the previous 36 ones, one obtains
in fact the evaluation of the variable y(83), that is, a total of 61 evaluations out of
the 177 variables of the algebraR93,84. This is enough to have deciseconds computa-
tions for the Gro¨bner bases. Precisely, our guess-and-determine strategy for Bivium
consists in computing the Gro¨bner bases of all ideals J ′′B + L+ Eα1,...,α38 ⊂ R93,84
where
(8)
Eα1,...,α38 = 〈x(68) + α1, x(71) + α2, . . . , x(92) + α9, y(2) + α10,
y(5) + α11, . . . , y(80) + α36, y(3) + α37, y(4) + α38〉
and the vector (α1, . . . , α38) ranges in the space K
38.
We propose now tables where we compare the solving time to obtain the set
VK(J
′′
B + Eα1,...,α38) by using Gro¨bner bases and SAT solvers. For Gro¨bner bases,
we make use of two main implementations of the Buchberger algorithm that are
available in the computer algebra system Singular [7], namely std and slimgb.
The considered SAT solvers are minisat [11] and cryptominisat [24] which are
widely used in cryptanalysis.
We have carried out the computations on a server: Intel(R) Core(TM) i7− 8700
CPU @ 3.20GHz, 6 Cores, 12 Threads, 32 GB RAM with a Debian based Linux
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operating system. In our tables, we abbreviate milliseconds and seconds by ms and
s, respectively.
Table 1. 90% Confidence Interval for timings with random guesses
# ks bits slimgb (ms) std (ms) MiniSat (s) CrMiniSat (s)
180 (160, 195) (326, 397) (9.33, 84.03) (9.61, 40.39)
185 (159, 170) (332, 367) (6.88, 60.24) (7.33, 28.41)
190 (119, 134) (353, 411) (6.94, 63.98) (9.59, 38.26)
195 (123, 138) (342, 397) (6.55, 67.57) (7.69, 25.26)
Table 2. 90% Confidence Interval for timings with correct guess
# ks bits slimgb (ms) std (ms) MiniSat (s) CrMiniSat (s)
180 (172, 187) (330, 350) (1.21, 53.81) (2.71, 33.32)
185 (178, 191) (352, 388) (0.15, 49.59) (0.24, 15.85)
190 (127, 145) (351, 411) (0.81, 24.56) (0.23, 31.52)
195 (122, 135) (328, 348) (1.08, 36.50) (6.72, 19.92)
In both tables, the rows correspond to different choices of the number of keystream
bits that are used for the attack. The second and third column present the 90%
confidence intervals for Gro¨bner bases timings that are obtained by slimgb and
std. The fourth and fifth column contain the intervals for SAT solvers timings
corresponding to minisat and cryptominisat.
In Table 1, the confidence intervals for Gro¨bner bases are computed for 24 dif-
ferent random (key, iv)-pairs and 210 different random guesses of the 38 variables
in (8) for each (key, iv)-pair. In other words, the confidence intervals contain 90%
of the timings that are obtained by a total of 214 computations. The intervals for
SAT solvers are computed for the same set of 24 (key, iv)-pairs and with a subset
of 24 different random guesses from the set that we have considered for Gro¨bner
bases. The motivation of such reduction are larger total computing times for SAT
solving.
Similarly, in Table 2 the confidence intervals are computed for the same 24 (key,
iv)-pairs of Table 1 and the correct guess of the 38 variables corresponding to each
(key, iv)-pair.
For Bivium attack, the tables show that the procedure slimgb is faster than
std. This happens because “slim”, that is, compact elements in the resulting
Gro¨bner bases imply faster S-polynomial reductions which are the most expensive
component of these computations. Moreover, we have that Gro¨bner bases perform
better than SAT solvers for computing solutions of the algebraic systems involved in
the Bivium attack. This is especially true for the UNSAT case which is dominant
for computing total complexity. About 190 keystream bits are the best choice
for the attack and we conclude that its average total complexity for a sequential
computation is 1/2 · 0.12 · 238 s ∼ 234 s.
7. Attacking KeeLoq
In this section we consider a difference block cipher which is named KeeLoq.
This cipher has important applications in remote keyless entry systems which are
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used, for instance, by automotive industry. KeeLoq is a proprietary cipher [3]
whose cryptographic algorithm was created by Gideon Kuhn at the University of
Pretoria in the mid-1980s. Starting from the mid-1990s, the cipher was widely
used by car manufactures but it has begun to be cryptanalysed only in 2007. In
particular, we mention the paper [5] where there are algebraic attacks to KeeLoq
that have inspired this section. For another important class of “meet-in-the-middle
attacks”, see [15].
The block cipher KeeLoq is defined by a reducible invertible difference system
over the base field K = GF(2), where the key subsystem consists of a single homoge-
neous linear equation (LFSR). In fact, its state transition K-linear map corresponds
to a cyclic permutation matrix of period 64. In addition to the key equation, the
invertible system consists of an explicit difference cubic equation involving a single
key variable. Precisely, the KeeLoq system is the following one
(9)


k(64) = k(0),
x(32) = x(0) + x(16) + x(9) + x(1) + x(20)x(31)
+ x(1)x(31) + x(20)x(26) + x(1)x(26) + x(9)x(20)
+ x(1)x(9) + x(1)x(9)x(31) + x(1)x(20)x(31)
+ x(9)x(26)x(31) + x(20)x(26)x(31) + k(0).
The key, that is, the initial state of the key equation, consists therefore of 64 bits
and the plaintext and ciphertext are 32 bits vectors. In other words, any t-state
of KeeLoq consists of 64 + 32 = 96 bits. The final clock of this difference block
cipher is defined as the clock T = 8 · 64 + 16 = 528. By Theorem 3.2, we compute
the inverse of (9) as the following system
(10)


k(64) = k(0),
x(32) = x(0) + x(31) + x(23) + x(16) + x(23)x(31)
+ x(6)x(31) + x(1)x(31) + x(12)x(23) + x(6)x(12)
+ x(1)x(12) + x(1)x(23)x(31) + x(1)x(12)x(31)
+ x(1)x(6)x(23) + x(1)x(6)x(12) + k(0).
To describe a multiple plaintext-ciphertext pairs attack to KeeLoq, consider
two such pairs (v′, v′′), (w′, w′′) ∈ K32 × K32, where v′ = (α′0, . . . , α
′
31), v
′′ =
(α′′0 , . . . , α
′′
31) and w
′ = (β′0, . . . , β
′
31), w
′′ = (β′′0 , . . . , β
′′
31). Then, define the poly-
nomial algebra R′ = K[X ′] where X ′ =
⋃
t≥0{k(t), x(t), y(t)} and consider the
following set
G′ = {k(64) + k(0),
x(32) + x(0) + x(31) + x(23) + x(16) + x(23)x(31) + x(6)x(31)
+ x(1)x(31) + x(12)x(23) + x(6)x(12) + x(1)x(12) + x(1)x(23)x(31)
+ x(1)x(12)x(31) + x(1)x(6)x(23) + x(1)x(6)x(12) + k(0),
y(32) + y(0) + y(31) + y(23) + y(16) + y(23)y(31) + y(6)y(31)
+ y(1)y(31) + y(12)y(23) + y(6)y(12) + y(1)y(12) + y(1)y(23)y(31)
+ y(1)y(12)y(31) + y(1)y(6)y(23) + y(1)y(6)y(12) + k(0)}.
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We define the difference ideal I ′ = 〈G′〉σ ⊂ R′ and the linear ideal J ′ = J ′(0) +
J ′(T ) ⊂ R′ where
J ′(0) = 〈x(0) + α′0, . . . , x(31) + α
′
31, y(0) + β
′
0, . . . , y(31) + β
′
31〉,
J ′(T ) = 〈x(T ) + α′′0 , . . . , x(T + 31) + α
′′
31, y(T ) + β
′′
0 , . . . , y(T + 31) + β
′′
31〉.
An algebraic attack to KeeLoq by the plaintext-ciphertext pairs (v′, v′′) and
(w′, w′′) consists in computing VK(I
′ + J ′). Note that we can indeed assume that
the variables clocks are bounded by T + 31, that is, we solve over the finite set
of variables
⋃
0≤t≤T+31{k(t), x(t), y(t)}. Actually, the computation of VK(I
′ + J ′)
is unfeasible for T = 528. If we would assume that T = 512 = 8 · 64, we could
use the trick of fixed pairs which is described at the end of Section 5. Briefly, if
(u(t), v(t)) ∈ K64 × K32 denotes the t-state of the system (9), the trick consists in
computing enough fixed points v(0) = v(512) by the knowledge of the encryption
function and to assume that some of them are in fact fixed points v(0) = v(64). By
means of a couple of such plaintext-ciphertext pairs (v(0), v(0)), we are reduced to
compute VK(I
′ + J ′) for T = 64.
The problem now is how to compute v(512) from the ciphertext v(528). If
we would assume that the variables k(0), . . . , k(15) are evaluated by the correct
corresponding key bits, we could apply the inverse cipher (10) since these bits are
the only ones which are involved in the computation of v(512) from v(528). We
don’t know in fact such correct evaluation and hence we need to try all 216 values
of the variables k(0), . . . , k(15). On the other hand, milliseconds are enough to
compute each set VK(I
′ + J ′ + Eα0,...,α15) where T = 64, (α1, . . . , α15) ∈ K
16 and
Eα0,...,α15 = 〈k(0) + α0, . . . , k(15) + α15〉.
As usual, such solving can be provided by Gro¨bner bases or SAT solvers.
We conclude that the total complexity of this algebraic attack to KeeLoq can
be described by the formula
(a · b · 232 + c) · 216
where a is the average percentage of the plaintext space K32 containing enough
fixed points v(0) = v(512), b is the average encryption and decryption time for
528 + 16 clocks and c is the average total computing time for obtaining the sets
VK(I
′ + J ′ + Eα0,...,α15) for each couple of such fixed points. The authors of [5]
suggest that there are 26% of keys such that a = 60%. Among the computed fixed
points v(0) = v(512), they also assume a good chance that at least one couple
v′(0), v′′(0) of them is such that v′(0) = v′(64), v′′(0) = v′′(64). In our experiments
we make use of 4 distinct random such “weak keys”.
In the following tables we present statistics of the values b, c. Similarly to Sec-
tion 6, the solving time c is provided for Gro¨bner basis algorithms and SAT solvers
and it appears in the columns corresponding to slimgb, std, minisat, cryp-
tominisat. Recall that c is the total computing time for solving the algebraic
systems corresponding to all couples that are obtained by computed fixed points
v(0) = v(512).
Table 3. 90% Confidence Interval for timings with random guesses
b (ms) slimgb (ms) std (ms) MiniSat (ms) CrMiniSat (ms)
(3.2, 3.9) · 2−10 (108, 165) (42, 48) (13, 27) (17, 32)
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Table 4. 90% Confidence Interval for timings with correct guess
b (ms) slimgb (ms) std (ms) MiniSat (ms) CrMiniSat (ms)
(2.9, 3.2) · 2−10 (93, 183) (27, 93) (12, 27) (16, 32)
In Table 3, we present 90% confidence intervals corresponding to 4 weak keys and
4 distinct random guesses of the variables k(0), . . . , k(15) for each key. The reason
of such small number is that the total encryption-decryption time a · b · 232 when
a = 0.6 is about 2.5 hours by an executable C file. The confidence interval of b, that
is, the timing for a single encryption-decryption is obtained by the corresponding
interval of this total time.
In Table 4 the confidence intervals are computed for the same 4 weak keys and
the correct guess of the 16 variables corresponding to each key.
In both tables, we observe that the value of b is almost uniform and this happens
because for each key the computations differ only in the last 16 decryption clocks.
For the algebraic systems involved in the KeeLoq attack, the SAT solvers seem to
be the best option. Nevertheless, note that in the tables of Section 6 and 7, the time
for computing ANF-to-CNF conversion (see, for instance, [2]) is not considered. In
particular, for KeeLoq attack this would imply that Gro¨bner bases (std method)
and SAT solvers have comparable timings. In any case, for considered guesses of
the variables k(0), . . . , k(15), this solving time c shows to be very small with respect
to d = a · b · 232 which is total search time for enough fixed points. In other words,
the total complexity of the attack is practically d · 216 or it is half of this time in
the average case.
8. Conclusions and further directions
In this paper we have shown that the notion of system of explicit difference
equations over a finite field is a useful tool to define and study a large class of
stream and block ciphers. Secure ciphers belong to such class, as, for instance,
Trivium. The algebraic properties of difference ciphers imply algebraic attacks
that can be used to establish the security degree of a specific cipher given by some
set of equations. As a further development of the theory of difference ciphers we
suggest to study how to compute and maximize their period in the non-linear case.
Finally, other classes of ciphers can be introduced for more general state transition
endomorphisms.
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